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Choices with respect to labor force participation and medical treatment are increasingly intertwined. Technological
advances present patients with new choices and may facilitate continued employment for the growing number
of chronically ill individuals. We examine joint work/treatment decisions of end stage renal disease patients, a
group for whom these tradeoffs are particularly salient. Using a simultaneous equations probit model, we find that
treatment choice is a significant predictor of employment status. However, the effect size is considerably smaller
than in models that do not consider the joint nature of these choices.
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Introduction
A substantial body of literature has examined interactions between health and the labor
market (see Currie and Madrian, 1999, for a review). However, the role of medical care
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in influencing labor market outcomes has received relatively little attention outside the
literature on the cost-effectiveness of medical interventions. Even papers that have used
instrumental variables techniques to address the endogeneity of health (e.g., Lee, 1982;
Haveman et al., 1994; Ettner et al., 1997; Ettner, 2000) have not analyzed how the choice
among available medical treatments or the change in available treatments over time can
mediate the effects of health on outcomes such as labor force participation, wages, earnings,
and hours.
Given the increasing number of individuals with chronic illness and the proliferation of
treatment options, the importance of the inter-relationship between treatment choices and
employment will continue to grow. For example, projections suggest that the number of
individuals suffering from chronic illness will grow from 125 million in 2000 (accounting
for 75 percent of health care spending) to 157 million in 2020 (accounting for 80 percent of
health care spending) (Wu and Green, 2000). During this period, medical advances such as
organ transplantation, minimally invasive surgical techniques, and new drug therapies will
present chronically ill patients with new choices that may facilitate labor force participation.
As medical and labor market choices have become increasingly intertwined, policy mak-
ers have reacted accordingly. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
requires employers to make “reasonable” accommodations for their workers with health
limitations. Likewise, work incentives exist both in the Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) program (a 9 month period in which labor market earnings do not reduce benefits
and deduction of work-related health expenditures from countable income) and in the Sup-
plemental Security Income (SSI) program (continuation of Medicaid eligibility and less
than dollar-for-dollar benefit reductions for beneficiaries with labor market earnings).
In this paper we focus on the extent to which treatment decisions affect labor force
participation. Because treatment decisions are specific to clinical conditions, a meaningful
analysis of the interactions between treatment and labor market decisions requires a focus on
persons with a particular diagnosis. Thus, the analysis is confined to patients with End Stage
Renal Disease (ESRD; chronic kidney failure), an area where these choices are particularly
relevant and data are well suited for the analysis. Some dialysis methods allow more flexible
treatment scheduling to accommodate work or other activities. Thus, it is likely that the
desire to work influences the choice of treatment method and vice versa. To address the
potential endogeneity of treatment choice and employment, we estimate a simultaneous
probit model using instrumental variables to control for the joint nature of these decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: a description of employment patterns
among ESRD patients, data, methods, results, and the discussion and conclusions.
Employment and Treatment Choices among ESRD Patients
End stage renal disease provides a prime example of a population where employment
decisions in the presence of a severe, chronic illness are quite salient. In 1997, there were
378,862 ESRD patients in the United States, 71 percent of which were treated with dialysis
(USRDS, 2002). The percentage of patients working drops precipitously upon initiation of
dialysis. One study reported that 73 percent of patients worked prior to beginning dialysis but
only 24 percent continued to work afterward despite the fact that a non-trivial minority of the
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non-workers reported being willing and able work (Curtin, Oberley and Sacksteder, 1996).
These patients face a variety of impediments to employment including poor physical or
emotional functioning, coexisting diseases, concern over loss of benefits relative to earning
potential, and, perhaps most importantly, the rigors of undergoing dialysis. The choice of
a mode of dialysis can significantly affect the ability to work. Peritoneal dialysis (PD),
one form of which requires several daily exchanges of dialysis fluid performed by patients
themselves while other forms allow overnight home treatments, is relatively more flexible
than in-center hemodialysis (HD). HD typically requires three weekly sessions lasting 3
to 4 hours each. Unlike in-center HD, PD does not require travel to a dialysis center for
long treatments and is therefore less likely to disrupt a patient’s work schedule. Daily PD
treatments can be scheduled, to a degree, around work and other activities on a day-to-day
basis at the discretion of the patient.
Not only is ESRD a relatively common disabling condition, but it is also very costly
to treat. A diagnosis of ESRD automatically entitles an individual, regardless of age, to
Medicare health insurance coverage under the program’s disability provisions. Medicare
payments per patient year averaged $46,691 in 2000 and totaled $12.4 billion nationwide
(USRDS, 2002). The share of total Medicare spending devoted to ESRD patients rose from
4.5 percent in 1991 to 5.8 percent in 2000 (USRDS, 2002). In an attempt to shift more of the
costs of ESRD care onto the private sector, Congress recently extended the period during
which Medicare would be the secondary insurer from 18 to 30 months for ESRD patients
who have employer provided, group health insurance. This policy relies on the ability and
willingness of ESRD patients to gain and maintain employment. Further, the total Medicare
spending per PD patient was 15% lower than spending per HD patient (USRDS, 2002).
Although part of this difference likely reflects the selection of somewhat healthier patients
into PD, it also reflects efficiencies such as the lower need for expensive, anti-anemia
medication among PD patients. Thus, treatment choice has direct cost implications aside
from its impact on employment.
Previous research on employment of dialysis patients has appeared primarily in the
medical literature (e.g., Wolcott and Nissenson, 1988; Julius et al., 1989; Kutner, Borgan and
Fielding, 1991; Holley and Nespor, 1994; Curtin, Oberley and Sacksteder, 1996). Most of
these studies find that PD patients are more likely to be employed than HD patients. However,
the literature has ignored the endogeneity of treatment choice despite the likelihood that
patients who desire employment tend to choose PD. Thus, no causal inference can be drawn
and the literature cannot inform efforts to improve the availability of PD. Further, most of
this literature has considered the role of earnings potential only indirectly through the effects
of variables such as education.
Data
The data for this study were derived from Wave II of the United States Renal Data System’s
(USRDS) Dialysis Morbidity and Mortality Study (DMMS-II). This survey, funded by the
National Institutes of Health, was administered during 1996. The sample is designed to be
representative of all incident (newly treated) dialysis patients in the United States during
1996. Twenty five percent of all U.S. dialysis units were randomly chosen. Within each
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chosen unit, a random sample of patients over the age of 18 who initiated chronic dialysis
treatment during 1996 was drawn. Treatment modality (HD or PD) was defined on the 60th
day following the initiation of dialysis, consistent with the conventional clinical definition
of the initial stable dialysis modality. 4011 patients were included. For each patient, a set of
core clinical and demographic information was abstracted from medical records. In addition,
each patient was given a lengthy survey which included items on quality of life, pre-dialysis
medical care, choice of dialysis modality, and employment. For a detailed description of
DMMS-II, see USRDS (1997).
Patients under age 23 or over age 64 were excluded from our analysis. The lower restric-
tion ensures that almost all included patients have completed their education and the upper
restriction reflects the rarity of employment among ESRD patients over age 64. Unfortu-
nately, the response rate for the lengthy patient questionnaire was low. Only 628 of 2275
(28%) of patients in our age range completed the employment portion of the questionnaire
and, hence, had the wage data necessary to include them in our models. Respondents were
somewhat younger and had fewer comorbid conditions than non-respondents. Thus, our
estimates do not necessarily reflect the entire, working age dialysis population. Rather, they
may better reflect a somewhat healthier than average subset of the population for whom
employment issues are most likely to be salient.
Methods
Both dependent variables are binary (dialysis modality and employment). Further, because
desire to work is likely to influence the choice of modality and vice versa, dialysis modality
is an included endogenous variable on the right hand side of the employment equation
and employment is an included endogenous variable on the right hand side of the dialysis
modality equation. Thus, we estimate a simultaneous probit model (Maddala, 1983). The
structural model for each dependent variable is a probit:
P∗ = αP + βP X P + γP E + u P
P = 1 if P∗ > 0 (1)
P = 0 otherwise
and
E∗ = αE + βE X E + γE P + uE
E = 1 if E∗ > 0 (2)
E = 0 otherwise
where P∗ and E∗ are index variables representing the desire for peritoneal dialysis and
employment respectively and P and E are the associated indicator variable for the observed
choices.
Estimation follows a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, probit maximum likelihood is
used to estimate a reduced form equation for dialysis modality using all exogenous variables
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as predictors. Predicted dialysis modality is substituted for P in the second stage, where
the structural equations are also estimated by probit maximum likelihood. The estimating
equations for dialysis modality and employment are specified as follows:
P = αP + βP X P + γP Ê + u P
E = αE + βE X E + γE P̂ + uE
where X P and X E are matrices of exogenous variables influencing the choice of modality
and employment, respectively. Variables common to X P and X E include hourly wage,
demographics (e.g., age, sex, marital status, living conditions), and comorbid conditions
(e.g., cardiovascular conditions, diabetes, cancer, HIV infection or AIDS, chronic pain,
general health assessment). Covariance matrices and standard errors are adjusted for the
inclusion of estimated covariates in the second stage of the estimation (Maddala, 1983).
We employ a novel method to characterize potential wages for non-working kidney
dialysis patients. The patient survey asked for the actual wage of those who were employed.
For those not employed, the survey asked for the wage they thought they would receive
if they were to take a job. Hence, we have a direct estimate of the earnings potential of
non-workers that can be used to circumvent the problem of unobserved wages. Since most
working age dialysis patients were employed shortly before initiating dialysis, non-workers
are likely to have a reasonable basis for estimating their earning power. The distribution of
anticipated wages for non-workers has face validity as it is similar to the distribution of actual
wages, but with a lower median. To further establish the plausibility of these responses, we
estimated a wage equation for workers and then entered the characteristics of non-workers to
determine their predicted wage. Non-workers’ predicted wages were indeed lower than the
average wage of employed patients and quite similar to the self-reported, anticipated wages.
Several instrumental variables were used to identify the effect of dialysis modality on
employment. These variables are hypothesized to influence modality choice but not em-
ployment (except through their impact on modality). Distance from the patient’s residence
to the nearest hemodialysis facility will determine the relative convenience of hemodialysis
(which requires 3 trips weekly to a dialysis center) vs. peritoneal dialysis (which does not re-
quire regular trips to a dialysis center). Instrumental variables based on distance to providers
have previously been used in other contexts (e.g., McClellan, McNeil and Newhouse, 1994).
Beliefs about clinical effectiveness of the different dialysis modalities are also used as instru-
ments because they would be expected to influence modality choice for reasons unrelated to
the desire to maintain the patient’s own employment. We use the patient’s opinion at the start
of dialysis as to which modality provides longer survival. We also use variables indicating
whether the patient was first informed of their abnormal kidney function less than one week
before initiating dialysis and whether a patient first saw a nephrologist (kidney specialist)
less than one month or not at all before initiating dialysis. These indicators of pre-ESRD
care are expected to influence modality because patients who lack adequate time to plan
for the modality choice and undergo the self-care training required for PD generally select
HD. A final instrument is the extent of burden the patient reports that HD would pose for
other members of their family (e.g., patient would be expected to be more likely to choose
PD if they had to rely on family members to transport them to and from an HD center).
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To identify the effect of employment on choice of modality, indicators of local eco-
nomic conditions (unemployment rate and its square and median income in the patient’s
zip code) were used as instruments. Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in
Table 1.
In addition to the two-stage estimates, we also estimate the employment and modality
equations without accounting for endogeneity. These “naı̈ve”, single equation models allow
us to determine impact of ignoring endogeneity on the estimated effect of dialysis modality
choice on the employment decision and vice versa. Several specification tests were per-
formed, including Hausman tests for exogeneity, overidentification tests, and tests of the
power of the instrumental variables.
Results
a. Naı̈ve Model
Estimates of the naı̈ve employment equation that treats dialysis modality as exogenous are
reported in the first column of Table 2. Consistent with previous estimates of the impact of
modality on employment, PD patients are much more likely to work. For a patient with the
median characteristics for all explanatory variables other than dialysis modality, the model
predicts a 51.3% probability of employment for a PD patient vs. a 32.2% probability for an
HD patients. In relative terms, PD patients are 59.2% more likely to be employed than are
HD patients.
Likewise, the naı̈ve modality choice model that treats employment as exogenous (first
column of Table 4) predicts that employed patients are more likely to choose PD as their
method of dialysis. Again at the sample medians for all other explanatory variables, the
model predicts that an employed patient has a 77.7% probability of choosing PD whereas
an unemployed patient has only a 64.8% chance of choosing PD, representing a 19.9%
relative increase in the probability of PD.
b. Two-Stage Results
We performed several specification tests for the instruments and the assumption of exo-
geneity. First, the instruments should be correlated with the endogenous variable in the
first-stage equation. The variables excluded from the second stage employment model had
the expected signs and were significant both individually (p < 0.05 in t-tests) and jointly
(likelihood ratio test p < 0.01) in the first stage dialysis modality model. The variables
excluded from the second stage modality choice model only attained marginal significance
in the first stage employment model (two of three significant at the p < 0.01 level), but
were jointly significant (p < 0.05). Second, the explanatory power of the first-stage equa-
tions was good, with pseudo-R2 of 0.71 in the PD equation and 0.53 in the employment
equation. Third, the instruments should not predict the second stage equations significantly
better than using only the predicted value of the included endogenous variable. To test the
overidentifying restrictions, we determined (1) whether a two-stage probit model including
the instruments in the second stage fit the data significantly better than a model including
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for newly treated dialysis patients, ages 23–64, 1996 (n = 602).
Variablea Mean s.d.b
Peritoneal dialysis (%) 60.8 –
Employed (%) 45.2 –
Age (years) 45.6 10.8
Female (%) 47.3 –
Hispanic (%) 9.1 –
Black (%) 31.4 –
Other race (%) 7.3 –
Education (%) (College graduate)
Less than 12 years 13.8 –
High school graduate 34.9 –
Some college 24.3 –
Not reported 7.6 –
Married (%) 55.7 –
Live alone (%) 15.1 –
Hourly wage ($) 12.4 7.8
Health status (%) (Good)
Excellent 3.2 –
Very good 14.0 –
Fair 34.9 –
Poor 7.6 –
Not reported 2.5 –
Limited in activities of daily living (%) 24.9 –
Economic indicators for zip code of patient residence
Median annual household income ($1000) 29.6 10.5
Unemployment (%) 7.4 4.2
Distance from patient residence to nearest hemodialysis facility (miles) 6.9 10.7
Predialysis medical care (%) (Other)
Told of abnormal kidney function within one week of start of dialysis 8.6 –
First saw nephrologist within one month of start of dialysis 11.0 –
Hemodialysis is a burden to my family (%) (Neutral)
Strongly agree 10.0 –
Agree 18.8 –
Disagree 19.8 –
Strongly disagree 11.5 –
Don’t know 23.1 –
The treatment that helps patients live longer is (%) (HD and PD are about the same):
HD 5.3 –
PD 17.3 –
Don’t know 59.6 –
aFor variables with more than two categories, the omitted group (in brackets) is the reference group for all models.
bReported only for continuous variables.
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Table 2. Results from employment models.a
Single Equation Model Two-Stage Model
Estimated Estimated
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
PDb 0.494 <0.01 0.152 <0.01
Age 0.063 0.15 0.060 0.17
Age squared −0.001 0.06 −0.001 0.08
Female 0.038 0.75 0.031 0.80
Hispanic −0.051 0.82 −0.015 0.95
Black −0.182 0.22 −0.150 0.32
Other race −0.301 0.19 −0.270 0.24
Education (versus college graduate)
Less than 12 years −0.592 <0.01 −0.547 0.02
High school graduate −0.670 <0.01 −0.634 <0.01
Some college −0.464 0.01 −0.451 0.02
Not reported −0.406 0.10 −0.385 0.11
Married 0.207 0.13 0.197 0.15
Live alone 0.221 0.22 0.231 0.19
Hourly wage 0.014 0.09 0.014 0.09
Health status (versus good)
Excellent 0.629 0.08 0.660 0.06
Very good 0.327 0.07 0.353 0.05
Fair −0.281 0.04 −0.273 0.05
Poor −0.522 0.04 −0.501 0.05
Not reported 0.758 0.05 0.741 0.05
Limited in activities of daily living −0.190 0.18 −0.178 0.21
Diabetes (versus no diabetes)
Yes, as primary cause of ESRD −0.121 0.36 −0.114 0.38
Yes, but not primary cause of ESRD −0.128 0.73 −0.115 0.76
Peripheral vascular disease −0.443 0.02 −0.445 0.02
HIV or AIDS −1.207 0.04 −1.209 0.04
Instrumental variables
Median annual household income in patient zip code ($1000) 0.014 0.06 0.014 0.06
Unemployment rate in patient zip code −0.077 0.14 −0.077 0.14
Unemployment rate squared 0.004 0.08 0.004 0.07
aBoth models also include the following clinical variables as covariates: coronary heart disease/coronary artery
disease, other heart disease, cerebrovascular accident, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, neoplasm and severe
or very severe bodily pain.
bPD is a binary variable in the single equation model and a continuous variable (the likelihood of the individual
selecting PD in the two-stage model.
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just the predicted values of the endogenous right-hand side variables, and (2) whether single
equation models including the instruments fit significantly better than the restricted models
that exclude the instruments (see Bollen, Guilkey and Mroz, 1995). The instruments for PD
passed these overidentification tests. The selected instruments for employment, median zip
code income and zip code unemployment rate and its square, were not significant in the
second-stage PD equation. However, another potential instrument, the actual or anticipated
wage, while not quite significant in the second stage (p = 0.16) was a significant predictor
in the naı̈ve, single equation model (p = 0.04). Although we expected that wage would
only influence modality choice through its effect on employment, it may be the case that
wage proxies for omitted characteristics that make a patient more likely to choose PD. For
example, since PD requires significant patient responsibility for self-care, higher earning
power may reflect generally higher levels of function that make it more likely a patient
can accept such responsibility. Therefore, to be conservative, we did not exclude wage
from the second stage modality choice equation. Finally, Hausman tests reject exogeneity
in both equations as the error terms from first-stage equations were significant predictors
in the second stage equations (both at the p < 0.01 level of significance). Because our
instruments passed the previous diagnostic tests, these Hausman tests are valid (Hausman,
1978).
The second stage, structural equations are presented in Table 2 for employment, alongside
the naı̈ve model that ignores endogeneity. The changes in the relative probability of working
associated with key variables are reported in Table 3. Table 4 presents the second stage,
structural equations for dialysis modality alongside the naı̈ve model, and Table 5 reports
changes in the relative probability of working associated with key variables. Predicted PD
from the first stage increased the likelihood of employment, but the magnitude of the effect
is considerably smaller than in the naı̈ve model. Recall that in the naı̈ve model, the absolute
probability of employment was about 20 percentage points higher among PD patients than
among HD patients and the relative increase was nearly 60%. In the two-stage model, the
absolute increase is only 6 percentage points (46.6% for PD patients vs. 40.6% for HD),
representing a 14.7% relative increase in the probability of working. The coefficient on
predicted employment is very precisely estimated (p < 0.01). Thus, we can conclude
that although peritoneal dialysis does have a causal effect on dialysis patients’ ability to
participate in the labor force, the magnitude of this effect is relatively small in absolute terms
and much smaller than the effect implied by the naı̈ve model and most previous estimates
in the literature which, like the naı̈ve model, ignored endogeneity.
There are several other notable findings with respect to employment. As expected, patients
with higher actual or anticipated wages were more likely to work (1.3% per $1 higher average
wage). Thus, for every one standard deviation ($7.80) increase in hourly earning potential,
the point estimate indicates a 10.1% relative increase in the probability of employment.
This estimate can provide some guidance to policymakers trying to predict the response
of labor supply among chronically ill workers with respect to wage subsidies or phase-out
of cash and non-cash benefits as a function of earnings, but it should be kept in mind that
the sample here appears somewhat younger and healthier than all dialysis patients and that
the effects of wages were not very precisely estimated (p = 0.09). In addition, those with
college educations and better overall health status were more likely to work. Older patients
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Table 3. Marginal effects of key variables on employment.a
Relative Change in Probability




PD (predicted) 14.7 <0.01
Wage (per $1) 1.3 0.09
Age (per 10 years) −23.6 <0.01c
Education (versus college graduate)
Less than 12 years −35.1 0.02
High school graduate −40.5 <0.01
Some college −29.0 0.02
Health status (versus good)
Excellent 54.8 0.06
Very good 30.4 0.05
Fair −23.0 0.05
Poor −40.5 0.05
Peripheral vascular disease −36.1 0.02
HIV or AIDS −79.8 0.04
Instrumental variables
Median income in zip code (per $5,000) 6.4 0.06
Unemployment in zip code (per 1%) −1.4 0.18c
aBoth models also include as covariates the remaining variables listed in Table 2.
bComputed at the mean for all other patient characteristics. The relative change for all continuous variables used
the probability at the mean value as the base.
cBased on a LR test of the joint significance of the linear and quadratic terms.
and those with a variety of comorbid conditions, including peripheral vascular disease and
HIV/AIDS were significantly less likely to work.
Turning to the model of the choice of dialysis modality, predicted employment from
the first stage increased the likelihood of choosing PD, but not significantly. Compared to
the naı̈ve model, which showed a 19.9% relative increase in the probability of PD choice
among those who were employed, the point estimate from the second-stage model shows
only an insignificant 6% relative increase in PD use (Table 5). Thus, after accounting for the
endogeneity of employment and treatment choice, it does not appear likely that a “beneficial
spiral” could be initiated by encouraging employment, which would increase use of PD,
leading to further increases in employment.
PD was significantly less likely to be chosen by black patients and by patients with
histories of coronary disease. Patients who lived further from a hemodialysis facility were
significantly more likely to choose PD. The changes in the relative probability of working
associated with these variables are reported in Table 4.
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Table 4. Results from modality choice models.a
Single Equation Model Two-Stage Model
Estimated Estimated
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Workingb 0.382 <0.01 0.131 0.71
Age −0.008 0.88 −0.007 0.89
Age squared 0.000 0.84 0.000 0.87
Female 0.126 0.36 0.117 0.41
Hispanic −0.229 0.33 −0.247 0.29
Black −0.594 <0.01 −0.589 <0.01
Other race −0.253 0.34 −0.249 0.38
Education (versus college graduate)
Less than 12 years −0.411 0.12 −0.429 0.22
High school graduate −0.298 0.16 −0.293 0.37
Some college −0.494 0.03 −0.489 0.11
Not reported 0.128 0.67 0.116 0.73
Married 0.132 0.41 0.128 0.47
Live alone 0.060 0.76 0.057 0.80
Hourly wage 0.019 0.04 0.018 0.16
Health status (versus good)
Excellent −0.133 0.71 −0.139 0.75
Very good −0.160 0.46 −0.144 0.56
Fair −0.051 0.75 −0.040 0.84
Poor −0.494 0.06 −0.478 0.18
Not reported 0.029 0.95 0.049 0.93
Limited in activities of daily living −0.323 0.04 −0.308 0.09
Diabetes (versus no diabetes)
Yes, as primary cause of ESRD −0.009 0.96 −0.021 0.90
Yes, but not primary cause of ESRD 0.426 0.30 0.456 0.28
Coronary heart disease/coronary artery disease −0.493 <0.01 −0.470 0.02
Instrumental variables
Distance from patient residence to nearest hemodialysis facility 0.015 0.06 0.015 0.06
Predialysis medical care (versus other)
Told of abnormal kidney function within one week −0.585 0.01 −0.590 0.01
of start of dialysis
First saw nephrologist within one month of start of dialysis −0.477 0.03 −0.460 0.04
Hemodialysis is a burden to my family (versus neutral)
Strongly agree 0.734 0.03 0.698 0.03
Agree −0.539 0.01 −0.524 0.01
(Continued on next page.)
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Table 4. (Continued).
Single Equation Model Two-Stage Model
Estimated Estimated
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Disagree −0.780 <0.01 −0.769 <0.01
Strongly disagree −0.987 <0.01 −0.977 <0.01
Don’t know 0.456 0.03 0.461 0.04
Treatment that helps patients live longer is: (versus they are
about the same)
HD −1.490 <0.01 −1.448 <0.01
PD 1.805 <0.01 1.805 <0.01
Don’t know −0.318 0.06 −0.306 0.07
aBoth models also include the following clinical variables as covariates: peripheral vascular disease, HIV or AIDS,
other heart disease, cerebrovascular accident, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, neoplasm and severe or very
severe bodily pain.
bWorking is a binary variable in the single equation model and a continuous variable (the likelihood of the individual
working) in the two-stage model.
Discussion and Conclusions
There is a large literature on the interactions between health status and labor market behavior,
and a growing portion of this literature has begun to treat health status as endogenous.
However, to our knowledge this is the first paper that has attempted to model the endogeneity
between actual medical treatment choices and labor market behavior.
As our data on ESRD patients illustrate, a significant number of chronically ill patients are
employed, often despite major comorbidities. Understanding predictors of employment and
barriers to employment can guide policy-makers in facilitating employment. For example,
the quadratic effect of age shows that employment probability, controlling for all other
factors in the model, is maximized for dialysis patients in their early thirties. Advancing
age (even at ages where most of the general population remains employed), poor health
status, lower education, and lower earning power all substantially decreased the likelihood
of employment. Earning power could be influenced by the structure of tax, subsidy and
in-kind transfer programs, but the other factors cannot be directly influenced by policy.
However, an awareness of the importance of these factors can help identify programs such
as employment counseling or vocational rehabilitation that may lower some of the barriers
to employment and can help target programs to individuals with the greatest potential for
workforce participation.
A key barrier to labor force participation among patients with chronic diseases, including
dialysis patients, is the convenience of scheduling treatment. In the case of dialysis, the
use of the relatively more flexible PD has declined in recent years and substantial regional
variations in use exist (USRDS, 2001). The reasons for this decline have been debated in
the clinical community. A number of potentially modifiable, structural factors have been
suggested as causes of the overall decline and regional variations in the use of PD. These
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Table 5. Marginal effects of key variables on modality choice.a
Relative Change in Probability




Employed (predicted) 6.0 0.71
Black −25.4 <0.01
Coronary heart disease/coronary artery disease −21.7 0.02
Instrumental variables
Distance to nearest hemodialysis facility (per 1 mile) 0.7 0.06
Predialysis medical care (versus more intensive care)
Told of abnormal kidney function <1 week of dialysis −27.7 0.01
First saw nephrologist <1 month of dialysis −21.0 0.04
Hemodialysis is a burden to my family (versus neutral)
Strongly agree 18.1 0.03
Agree −22.6 0.01
Disagree −34.7 <0.01
Strongly disagree −45.1 <0.01
Don’t know 13.5 0.04
The treatment that helps patients live longer is (versus the same):
HD −73.4 <0.01
PD 38.4 <0.01
aBoth models also include as covariates the remaining variables listed in Table 4.
bComputed at the mean for all other patient characteristics. The relative change for distance to nearest HD facility
used the probability at the mean distance as the base.
factors include the relative profitability of the modalities under Medicare reimbursement
policy, a growing scarcity of nurses and physicians with extensive PD experience, late
referral to specialty care resulting in limited time to plan modality choice, and the fact
that many dialysis centers currently offer their patients only HD have been suggested as
contributing to the decline (Mendelssohn, 2002; Nissenson, 2002). As a result, it is possible
that impediments to access to PD have impaired labor force participation in this chronically
ill population.
Previous estimates of the relationship between treatment choices and employment ignored
endogeneity. In the case of dialysis, we find that accounting for endogeneity of treatment
choice implies that the relatively more flexible (and hence work-friendly) modality (PD)
does facilitate employment, but to a lesser extent than would be implied by either the naı̈ve
model or previous literature that has ignored this endogeneity problem. Most of the ef-
fect of PD on employment in the naı̈ve model arises from endogenous selection of PD by
those patients who wish to maintain employment rather than from the ability of PD to ease
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work scheduling. Hence, the causal impact of the availability of PD on patients’ ability to
maintain employment is substantially smaller than prvious estimates have implied. Hence,
there is little potential for a shift towards PD or other home-based treatments to yield large
increases in the percentage of dialysis patients holding employer-provided health insurance,
which would enable the Medicare program to reduce outlays through its secondary payer
provisions.
Quality of life considerations are receiving increasing attention in both clinical research
and clinical decision-making, suggesting that the scope for employment preferences to influ-
ence treatment decisions, and vice versa, will rise. Interactions between health care choices
and employment will continue to become more important as the “baby boom” generation
ages and medical research continues to expand the number of conditions for which a variety
of treatment options exist. For example, treatment advances are transforming many forms of
cancer from acute illnesses into chronic conditions. Over 5 million Americans are survivors
of cancer who have lived with their disease for at least 5 years (Beyer, 1995). New cancer
treatments often require ongoing therapy, sometimes on a regular schedule and sometimes
at unpredictable intervals based on the course of the disease. Many cancer patients face a
choice between more intensive but time limited therapies (e.g., bone marrow transplanta-
tion) and less intensive therapies with longer duration. These therapies often involve side
effects such as fatigue that can directly impact ability or desire to work independent of the
time actually spent seeking care. Thus, joint treatment and labor market decisions similar
to those faced by the dialysis patients in this study are increasingly relevant to individuals
with other clinical conditions and understanding these decisions will become crucial to
understanding labor market behavior.
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